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Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Cruz, members and staff of the subcommittee, thank
you for giving me the opportunity to testify today about the constitutional and counterterrorism
implications of U.S. drone wars and targeted killing policy. I appreciate your commitment to
fostering a rigorous and transparent dialogue on this tough issue.
I am currently a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, where I teach
courses on international law, constitutional law and national security issues. I am also a Bernard
L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, and I write a weekly column for
Foreign Policy magazine. From April 2009 to July 2011, during a public service leave of
absence from Georgetown, I had the privilege of serving as Counselor to the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy at the Department of Defense. This testimony reflects my personal views
only, however.
Mr. Chairman, the mere mention of drones tends to arouse strong emotional reactions on
both sides of the political spectrum, and last week’s tragic events in Boston have raised the
temperature still further. Some demonize drones, denouncing them for causing civilian deaths or
enabling long-distance, “video game-like” killing, even as they ignore the fact that the same (or
worse) could equally be said of many other weapons delivery systems. Others glorify drones,
viewing them as a low- or no-cost way to “take out terrorists” wherever they may be found, with
little regard for broader questions of strategy or the rule of law.
I believe it is important to take a closer look both at what is and what isn’t new and
noteworthy about drone technologies and the activities they enable. Ultimately, “drones” as such
present us with few new issues—but the manner in which the United States has been using drone
strikes raises serious questions about their strategic efficacy and unintended consequences. Just
as troubling -- particularly with regard to this subcommittee’s mandate -- the legal theories used
by the Obama Administration to justify many US drone strikes risk undermining the rule of law.





It does not have to be this way, however. I believe that the President and Congress can
and should take action to place US targeted killing policy on firmer legal ground, and at the end
of this testimony I will offer some suggestions for how this might be accomplished.
In the first part of this testimony, I will first address some of the most common but
unfounded criticisms of US drone strikes. In the second section, I will discuss some of the
perceived advantages of drones, focusing on the ways in which drone technologies lower the
cost of using lethal force across borders. In the third section, I will highlight some of the strategic
costs of current US drone policy. In the fourth section, I will first discuss the concept of the rule
of law and the legal framework in which US drone strikes occur, then look specifically at the law
of armed conflict and finally at the international law of self-defense, highlighting the ways in
which existing legal frameworks offer only ambiguous guidance with regard to the legality of US
targeted killings. In the fifth section, I will briefly address the question of what precedent US
targeted killing policy is setting for other nations. In the sixth and final section, I will turn to the
question of reform. While it is beyond the scope of this testimony to fully examine the many
possible routes to improving oversight and accountability, I will briefly highlight a number of
possible ways for Congress to ensure that US targeted killing policy does not undermine rule of
law norms.

1. What’s not wrong with drones
Many of the most frequently heard criticisms of drones and drone warfare do not hold up
well under serious scrutiny – or, at any rate, there’s nothing uniquely different or worse about
drones, compared to other military technologies. Consider the most common anti-drone
arguments.
First, critics often assert that US drone strikes are morally wrong because the kill
innocent civilians. This is undoubtedly both true and tragic -- but it is not really an argument
against drone strikes as such. War kills innocent civilians, period. But the best available evidence
suggests that US drone strikes kill civilians at no higher a rate, and almost certainly at a lower
rate, than most other common means of warfare.
Much of the time, the use of drones actually permits far greater precision in targeting than
most traditional manned aircraft. Today's unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can carry very small
bombs that do less widespread damage, and UAVs have no human pilot whose fatigue might
limit flight time. Their low profile and relative fuel efficiency combines with this to permit them
to spend more time on target than any manned aircraft. Equipped with imaging technologies that
enable operators even thousands of miles away to see details as fine as individual faces, modern
drone technologies allow their operators to distinguish between civilians and combatants far
more effectively than most other weapons systems.
That does not mean civilians never get killed in drone strikes. Inevitably, they do,
although the covert nature of most US strikes and the contested environment in which they occur





makes it impossible to get precise data on civilian deaths. This lack of transparency inevitably
fuels rumors and misinformation. However, several credible organizations have sought to track
and analyze deaths due to US drone strikes. The British Bureau of Investigative Journalism
analyzed examined reports by "government, military and intelligence officials, and by credible
media, academic and other sources," for instance, and came up with a range, suggesting that the
344 known drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2012 killed between 2,562 and 3,325
people, of whom between 474 and 881 were likely civilians.1 (The numbers for Yemen and
Somalia are more difficult to obtain.) The New America Foundation, with which I am affiliated,
came up with slightly lower numbers, estimating that US drone strikes killed somewhere
between 1,873 and 3,171 people overall in Pakistan, of whom between 282 and 459 were
civilians. 2
Whether drones strikes cause "a lot" or "relatively few" civilian casualties depends what
we regard as the right point of comparison. Should we compare the civilian deaths caused by
drone strikes to the civilian deaths caused by large-scale armed conflicts? One study by the
International Committee for the Red Cross found that on average, 10 civilians died for every
combatant killed during the armed conflicts of the 20th century.3 For the Iraq War, estimates vary
widely; different studies place the ratio of civilian deaths to combatant deaths anywhere between
10 to 1 and 2 to 1.4
The most meaningful point of comparison for drones is probably manned aircraft. It's
extraordinarily difficult to get solid numbers here, but one analysis published in the Small Wars
Journal suggested that in 2007 the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths due to coalition air
attacks in Afghanistan may have been as high as 15 to 1.5 More recent UN figures suggest a far
lower rate, with as few as one civilian killed for every ten airstrikes in Afghanistan.6 But drone
strikes have also gotten far less lethal for civilians in the last few years: the New America
Foundation concludes that only three to nine civilians were killed during 72 U.S. drone strikes in
Pakistan in 2011, and the 2012 numbers were also low.7 In part, this is due to technological
advances over the last decade, but it's also due to far more stringent rules for when drones can
release weapons.
Few details are known about the precise targeting procedures followed by either US
armed forces or the Central Intelligence Agency with regard to drone strikes. The Obama
Administration is reportedly finalizing a targeted killing “playbook,”8 outlining in great detail the
procedures and substantive criteria to be applied. I believe an unclassified version of this should
be should be made public, as it may help to diminish concerns reckless or negligent targeting
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decisions. Even in the absence of specific details, however, I believe we can have confidence in
the commitment of both military and intelligence personnel to avoiding civilian casualties to the
greatest extent possible. The Obama Administration has stated that it regards both the military
and the CIA as bound by the law of war when force is used for the purpose of targeted killing.9 (I
will discuss the applicable law of war principles in section IV of this statement). What is more,
the military is bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Concern about civilian casualties is appropriate, and our targeting decisions, however
thoughtfully made, are only as good as our intelligence—and only as wise as our overall
strategy. Nevertheless, there is no evidence supporting the view that drone strikes cause
disproportionate civilian casualties relative to other commonly used means or methods of
warfare. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that if the number of civilian casualties is our
metric, drone strikes do a better job of discriminating between civilians and combatants than
close air support or other tactics that receive less attention.
Critics of US drone policy also decry the fact that drones enable US personnel to kill
from a safe distance, which seems to be viewed as somehow “unsavory.” But long-distance
killing” is neither something to automatically condemn nor something unique to drone
technologies. Military commanders naturally seek ways to kill enemies without risking the lives
of our own troops – and if drone technologies enable us to reduce the danger to our own
personnel, all things being equal this is surely a good thing, not a bad thing. No one would argue
that we should strip troops of body armor just to level the playing field.
It is also important to consider drone strikes in the context of the evolution of warfare.
After all, drones are hardly the only technology that has facilitated killing from a distance. In this
sense, drones don't present any "new" issues not already presented by aerial bombing -- or by
guns or bows and arrows, for that matter. The crossbow and later the long bow were considered
immoral in their day. In 1139, the Second Lateran Council of Pope Innocent II is said to have
"prohibit[ed] under anathema that murderous art of crossbowmen and archers, which is hateful to
God.”10 In the early 1600s, Cervantes took a similar view of artillery, which he called a "devilish
invention" allowing "a base cowardly hand to take the life of the bravest gentleman," with bullets
coming –like drones-- “nobody knows how or from whence."11
Other critics have decried  "the PlayStation mentality" created by drone
technologies. I cannot see, however, that drones any more "video game-like" than, say, having
cameras in the noses of cruise missiles. Regardless, there's little evidence that drone technologies
"reduce" their operators' awareness of human suffering. If anything, drone operators may be far
more keenly aware of the suffering they help inflict than any sniper or bomber pilot could be,
precisely because the technology enables such clear visual monitoring. Increasingly, there is
evidence that drone pilots, just like combat troops, can suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.
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A recent Air Force study found that 29 percent of drone pilots suffered from "burnout," with 17
percent "clinically distressed."12

2. The perceived advantages of drone strikes
For every critic who demonizes drones while ignoring their similarities to other lessdemonized technologies, there are as many others who seem to regard drones as a near-panacea –
an almost magical new technology that will allow us to economically stave off foreign threats
from the comfort and safety of home – or even, perhaps, find some new “fix” to the thorny
problems posed by “homegrown” attacks such as those on the Boston Marathon.
But the advantages of drones are as overstated and misunderstood as the problems they
pose—and in some ways, their very perceived advantages cause new problems. Drone
technologies temptingly lower or disguise the costs of lethal force, but their availability can blind
us to the potentially dangerous longer-term costs and consequences of our strategic choices.
Armed drones lower the perceived costs of using lethal force in at least three ways. First,
drones reduce the dollar cost of using lethal force inside foreign countries.13 Most drones are
economical compared with the available alternatives.14 Manned aircraft, for instance, are quite
expensive:15 Lockheed Martin's F-22 fighter jets cost about $150 million each; F-35s are $90
million; and F-16s are $55 million. But the 2011 price of a Reaper drone was approximately
$28.4 million, while Predator drones cost only about $5 million to make.16As with so many
things, putting a dollar figure on drones is difficult; it depends what costs are counted, and what
time frame is used. Nevertheless, drones continue to be perceived as cheaper by government
decision-makers.
Second, relying on drone strikes rather than alternative means reduces the domestic
political costs of using lethal force. Sending manned aircraft or special operations forces after a
suspected terrorist places the lives of U.S. personnel at risk, and full-scale invasions and
occupations endanger even more American lives. In contrast, using armed drones eliminates all
short-term risks to the lives of U.S. personnel involved in the operations.
Third, by reducing accidental civilian casualties,17 precision drone technologies reduce
the perceived moral and reputational costs of using lethal force. The US government is
extraordinarily concerned about avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties, and rightly so. There
are moral and legal reasons for this concern, and there are also pragmatic reasons: civilian
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casualties cause pain and resentment within local populations and host-country governments and
alienate the international community.
It is of course not a bad thing to possess military technologies that are cost little, protect
American lives and enable us to minimize civilian casualties. When new technologies appear to
reduce the costs of using lethal force, however, the threshold for deciding to use lethal force
correspondingly drops, and officials will be tempted to use lethal force with greater frequency
and less wisdom.
Over the last decade, we have seen US drone strikes evolve from a tool used in extremely
limited circumstances to go after specifically identified high-ranking al Qaeda officials to a tool
relied on in an increasing number of countries to go after an eternally lengthening list of putative
bad actors, with increasingly tenuous links to grave or imminent threats to the United States.
Some of these suspected terrorists have been identified by name and specifically targeted, while
others are increasingly targeted on the basis of suspicious behavior patterns.
Increasingly, drones strikes have targeted militants who are lower and lower down the
terrorist food chain,18 rather than terrorist masterminds.19 Although drone strikes are believed to
have killed more than 3,000 people since 2004,20 analysis by the New America Foundation and
more recently by a the McClatchy newspapers suggests that only a small fraction of the dead
appear to have been so-called "high-value targets."21 What’s more, drone strikes have spread
ever further from "hot" battlefields, migrating from Pakistan to Yemen to Somalia (and perhaps
to Mali22 and the Philippines as well).23
This increasing use of drone strikes to go after individuals with more and more tenuous
links to Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks pushes the furthest boundaries of Congress’ 2011
Authorization for use of Military Force. The AUMF authorized the President to “[U]se all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”
The AUMF’s language appears to restrict the use of force both with regard to who can be
targeted (those with some culpability for the 9/11 attacks) and with regard to the purpose for
which force is used (to prevent future attacks against the U.S.). As drone strikes expand beyond
Al Qaeda targets (to go after, for instance, suspected members of Somalia’s al Shabaab), it grows
increasingly difficult to justify such strikes under the AUMF. Do we believe al Shabaab was in
any way culpable for the 9/11 attacks? Do we believe al Shabaab, an organization with primarily
local and regional ambitions, has the desire or capability to engage in acts of international
terrorism against the United States?
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See http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/05-drones-philippines-ahmed
19





3. The true costs of current US drone policy
When we come to rely excessively on drone strikes as a counterterrorism tool, this has
potential costs of its own. Drones strikes enable a "short-term fix" approach to counterterrorism,
one that relies excessively on eliminating specific individuals deemed to be a threat, without
much discussion of whether this strategy is likely to produce long-term security gains.
Most counter-terrorism experts agree that in the long-term, terrorist organizations are
rarely defeated militarily. Instead, terrorist groups fade away when they lose the support of the
populations within which they work. They die out when their ideological underpinnings come
undone – when new recruits stop appearing—when the communities in which they work stop
providing active or passive forms of assistance—when local leaders speak out against them and
residents report their activities and identities to the authorities.
A comprehensive counterterrorist strategy recognizes this, and therefore relies heavily on
activities intended to undermine terrorist credibility within populations, as well as on activities
designed to disrupt terrorist communications and financing. Much of the time, these are the
traditional tools of intelligence and law enforcement. Kinetic force undeniably has a role to play
in counterterrorism in certain circumstances, but it is rarely a magic bullet.
In addition, overreliance on kinetic tools at the expense of other approaches can be
dangerous. Drone strikes -- lawful or not, justifiable or not – can have the unintended
consequence of increasing both regional instability and anti-American sentiment. Drone strikes
sow fear among the "guilty" and the innocent alike,24 and the use of drones in Pakistan and
Yemen has increasingly been met with both popular and diplomatic protests. Indeed, drone
strikes are increasingly causing dismay and concern within the US population.
As the Obama administration increases its reliance on drone strikes as the
counterterrorism tool of choice, it is hard not to wonder whether we have begun to trade tactical
gains for strategic losses. What impact will US drone strikes ultimately have on the stability of
Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia?25 To what degree -- especially as we reach further and further
down the terrorist food chain, killing small fish who may be motivated less by ideology than
economic desperation -- are we actually creating new grievances within the local population – or
even within diaspora populations here in the United States?26 As Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld asked during the Iraq war, are we creating terrorists faster than we kill them?27
At the moment, there is little evidence that US drone policy – or individual drone
strikes—result from a comprehensive assessment of strategic costs and benefits, as opposed to a
shortsighted determination to strike targets of opportunity, regardless of long-term impact. As a
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military acquaintance of mine memorably put it, drone strikes remain “a tactic in search of a
strategy.”

4. Drones and the rule of law
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the legal framework applicable to US drone
strikes. Both the United States and the international community have long had rules governing
armed conflicts and the use of force in national self-defense. These rules apply whether the lethal
force at issue involves knives, handguns, grenades or weaponized drones. When drone
technologies are used in traditional armed conflicts—on “hot battlefields” such as those in
Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, for instance – they pose no new legal issues. As Administration
officials have stated, their use is subject to the same requirements as the use of other lawful
means and methods of warfare.28
But if drones used in traditional armed conflicts or traditional self-defense situations
present no “new” legal issues, some of the activities and policies enabled and facilitated by
drone technologies pose significant challenges to existing legal frameworks.
As I have discussed above, the availability of perceived low cost of drone technologies
makes it far easier for the US to “expand the battlefield,” striking targets in places where it
would be too dangerous or too politically controversial to send troops. Specifically, drone
technologies enable the United States to strike targets deep inside foreign states, and do so
quickly, efficiently and deniably. As a result, drones have become the tool of choice for so-called
“targeted killing” – the deliberate targeting of an individual or group of individuals, whether
known by name or targeted based on patterns of activity, inside the borders of a foreign country.
It is when drones are used in targeted killings outside of traditional or “hot” battlefields that their
use challenges existing legal frameworks.
Law is almost always out of date: we make legal rules based on existing conditions and
technologies, perhaps with a small nod in the direction of predicted future changes. As societies
and technologies change, law increasingly becomes an exercise in jamming square pegs into
round holes. Eventually, that process begins to do damage to existing law: it gets stretched out of
shape, or broken. Right now, I would argue, US drone policy is on the verge of doing significant
damage to the rule of law.
A. The Rule of Law
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At root, the idea of “rule of law” is fairly simple, and well understood by Americans
familiar with the foundational documents that established our nation, such as the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The rule of law requires that governments
follow transparent, clearly defined and universally applicable laws and procedures. The goal of
the rule of law is to ensure predictability and stability, and to prevent the arbitrary exercise of
power. In a society committed to the rule of law, the government cannot fine you, lock you up, or
kill you on a whim -- it can restrict your liberty or take your property or life only in accordance
with pre-established processes and rules that reflect basic notions of justice, humanity and
fairness.
Precisely what constitutes a fair process is debatable, but most would agree that at a
minimum, fairness requires that individuals have reasonable notice of what constitutes the
applicable law, reasonable notice that they are suspected of violating the law, a reasonable
opportunity to rebut any allegations against them, and a reasonable opportunity to have the
outcome of any procedures or actions against them reviewed by some objective person or body.
These core values are enshrined both in the US Constitution and in international human rights
law instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the
United States is a party.
In ordinary circumstances, this bundle of universally acknowledged rights (together with
international law principles of sovereignty) means it is clearly unlawful for one state to target
and kill an individual inside the borders of another state. Recall, for instance, the 1976 killing of
Chilean dissident Orlando Letelier in Washington DC. When Chilean government intelligence
operatives planted a car bomb in the car used by Letelier, killing him and a US citizen
accompanying him, the United States government called this an act of murder—an unlawful
political assassination.
B. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict
Of course, sometimes the “ordinary” legal rules do not apply. In war, the willful killing of
human beings is permitted, whether the means of killing is a gun, a bomb, or a long-distance
drone strike. The law of armed conflict permits a wide range of behaviors that would be
unlawful in the absence of an armed conflict. Generally speaking, the intentional destruction of
private property and severe restrictions on individual liberties are impermissible in peacetime,
but acceptable in wartime, for instance. Even actions that a combatant knows will cause civilian
deaths are lawful when consistent with the principles of necessity, humanity, proportionality,29
and distinction.30
It is worth briefly explaining these principles. The principle of necessity requires parties
to a conflict to limit their actions to those that are indispensible for securing the complete
submission of the enemy as soon as possible (and that are otherwise permitted by international
law). The principle of humanity forbids parties to a conflict to inflict gratuitous violence or
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employ methods calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. The principle of proportionality
requires parties to ensure that the anticipated loss of life or property incidental to an attack is not
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.
Finally, the principle of discrimination or distinction requires that parties to a conflict direct their
actions only against combatants and military objectives, and take appropriate steps to distinguish
between combatants and non-combatants.31
This is a radical oversimplification of a very complex body of law.32 But as with the rule
of law, the basic idea is pretty simple. When there is no war -- when ordinary, peacetime law
applies -- agents of the state aren't supposed to lock people up, take their property or kill them,
unless they have jumped through a whole lot of legal hoops first. When there is an armed
conflict, however, everything changes. War is not a legal free-for-all33 -- torture, rape are always
crimes under the law of war, as is killing that is willful, wanton and not justified by military
necessity34 -- but there are far fewer constraints on state behavior.
Technically, the law of war is referred to using the Latin term “lex specialis” – special
law. It is applicable in—and only in -- special circumstances (in this case, armed conflict), and in
those special circumstances, it supersedes “ordinary law,” or “lex generalis,” the “general law”
that prevails in peacetime. We have one set of laws for “normal” situations, and another, more
flexible set of laws for “extraordinary” situations, such as armed conflicts.
None of this poses any inherent problem for the rule of law. Having one body of rules
that tightly restricts the use of force and another body of rules that is far more permissive does
not fundamentally undermine the rule of law, as long as we have a reasonable degree of
consensus on what circumstances trigger the “special” law, and as long as the “special law”
doesn’t end up undermining the general law.
To put it a little differently, war, with its very different rules, does not challenge ordinary
law as long as war is the exception, not the norm -- as long as we can all agree on what
constitutes a war -- as long as we can tell when the war begins and ends -- and as long as we all
know how to tell the difference between a combatant and a civilian, and between places where
there's war and places where there's no war.
Let me return now to the question of drones and targeted killings. When all these
distinctions I just mentioned are clear, the use of drones in targeted killings does not necessarily
present any great or novel problem. In Libya, for instance, a state of armed conflict clearly
existed inside the borders of Libya between Libyan government forces and NATO states. In that
context, the use of drones to strike Libyan military targets is no more controversial than the use
of manned aircraft.
That is because our core rule of law concerns have mostly been satisfied: we know there
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is an armed conflict, in part because all parties to it agree that there is an armed conflict, in part
because observers (such as international journalists) can easily verify the presence of uniformed
military personnel engaged in using force, and in part because the violence is, from an objective
perspective, widespread and sustained: it is not a mere skirmish or riot or criminal law
enforcement situation that got out of control. We know who the “enemy” is: Libyan government
forces. We know where the conflict is and is not: the conflict was in Libya, but not in
neighboring Algeria or Egypt. We know when the conflict began, we know who authorized the
use of force (the UN Security Council) and, just as crucially, we know whom to hold
accountable in the event of error or abuse (the various governments involved).35
Once you take targeted killings outside hot battlefields, it’s a different story. The Obama
Administration is currently using drones to strike terror suspects in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen,
and –perhaps—Mali and the Philippines as well. Defenders of the administration's increasing
reliance on drone strikes in such places assert that the US is in an armed conflict with “al Qaeda
and its associates,” and on that basis, they assert that the law of war is applicable -- in any place
and at any time -- with regard to any person the administration deems a combatant.
The trouble is, no one outside a very small group within the US executive branch has any
ability to evaluate who is and who isn’t a combatant. The war against al Qaeda and its associates
is not like World War II, or Libya, or even Afghanistan: it is an open-ended conflict with an
inchoate, undefined adversary (who exactly are al Qaeda’s “associates”?). What is more,
targeting decisions in this nebulous “war” are based largely on classified intelligence reporting.
As a result, Administration assertions about who is a combatant and what constitutes a threat are
entirely non-falsifiable, because they're based wholly on undisclosed evidence. Add to this still
another problem: most of these strikes are considered covert action, so although the US
sometimes takes public credit for the deaths of alleged terrorist leaders, most of the time, the US
will not even officially acknowledge targeted killings.
This leaves all the key rule-of-law questions related to the ongoing war against al Qaeda
and its "associates" unanswered.36 Based on what criteria might someone be considered a
combatant or directly participating in hostilities? What constitutes “hostilities” in the context of
an armed conflict against a non-state actor, and what does it mean to participate in them? And
just where is the war? Does the war (and thus the law of war) somehow "travel" with
combatants? Does the US have a “right” to target enemy combatants anywhere on earth, or does
it depend on the consent of the state at issue? Who in the United States government is authorized
to make such determinations, and what is the precise chain of command for such decisions?
I think the rule of law problem here is obvious: when “armed conflict” becomes a term
flexible enough to be applied both to World War II and to the relations between the United States
and “associates” of al Qaeda such as Somalia’s al Shabaab, the concept of armed conflict is not
very useful anymore. And when we lack clarity and consensus on how to recognize “armed
conflict,” we no longer have a clear or principled basis for deciding how to categorize US
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targeted killings. Are they, as the US government argues, legal under the laws of war? Or are
they, as some human rights groups have argued, unlawful murder?
C. Targeted Killing and the International Law of Self-Defense
When faced with criticisms of the law of war framework as a justification for targeted
killing, Obama Administration representatives often shift tack, arguing that international law
rules on national self-defense provide an alternative or additional legal justification for US
targeted killings. Here, the argument is that if a person located in a foreign state poses an
"imminent threat of violent attack" against the United States, the US can lawfully use force in
self-defense, provided that the defensive force used is otherwise consistent with law of war
principles.
Like law of war-based arguments, this general principle is superficially uncontroversial:
if someone overseas is about to launch a nuclear weapon at New York City, no one can doubt
that the United States has a perfect right (and the president has a constitutional duty) to use force
if needed to prevent that attack, regardless of the attacker's nationality.
But once again, the devil is in the details. To start with, what constitutes an "imminent"
threat? Traditionally, both international law and domestic criminal law understand that term
narrowly: 37 to be "imminent," a threat cannot be distant or speculative.38 But much like the Bush
Administration before it, the Obama Administration has put forward an interpretation of the
word “imminent” that bears little relation to traditional legal concepts.
According to a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper39—the most detailed legal
justification that has yet become public-- the requirement of imminence "does not require the
United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take
place in the immediate future." This seems, in itself, like a substantial departure from accepted
international law definitions of imminence.
But the White Paper goes even further, stating that "certain members of al Qaeda are
continually plotting attacks...and would engage in such attacks regularly [if] they were able to do
so, [and] the US government may not be aware of all... plots as they are developing and thus
cannot be confident that none is about to occur." For this reason, it concludes, anyone deemed to
be an operational leader of al Qaeda or its "associated forces" presents, by definition, an
imminent threat even in the absence of any evidence whatsoever relating to immediate or future
attack plans. In effect, the concept of "imminent threat" (part of the international law relating to
self-defense) becomes conflated with identity or status (a familiar part of the law of armed
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conflict).
That concept of imminence has been called Orwellian, and although that is an overused
epithet, in this context it seems fairly appropriate. According to the Obama Administration,
“imminent” no longer means “immediate,” and in fact the very absence of clear evidence
indicating specific present or future attack plans becomes, paradoxically, the basis for assuming
that attack may perpetually be “imminent.”
The 2011 Justice Department White Paper notes that the use of force in self-defense must
comply with general law of war principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity, and
distinction. The White Paper offers no guidance on the specific criteria for determining when an
individual is a combatant (or a civilian participating directly in hostilities), however. It also
offers no guidance on how to determine if a use of force is necessary or proportionate.
From a traditional international law perspective, this necessity and proportionality inquiry
relates both to imminence and to the gravity of the threat itself, but so far there has been no
public Administration statement as to how the administration interprets these requirements. Is
any threat of "violent attack" sufficient to justify killing someone in a foreign country, including
a U.S. citizen? Is every potential suicide bomber targetable, or does it depend on the gravity of
the threat? Are we justified in drone strikes against targets who might, if they get a chance at
some unspecified future point, place an IED that might, if successful, kill one person? Ten
people? Twenty? 2,000? How grave a threat must there be to justify the use of lethal force
against an American citizen abroad -- or against non-citizens, for that matter?
As I have noted, it is impossible for outsiders to fully evaluate US drone strikes, since so
much vital information remains classified. In most cases, we know little about the identities;
activities or future plans of those targeted. Nevertheless, given the increased frequency of US
targeted killings in recent years, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the Administration
conducts a rigorous necessity or proportionality analysis in all cases.
So far, the leaked 2011 Justice Department White Paper represents the most detailed legal
analysis of targeted killings available to the public. It is worth noting, incidentally, that this
White Paper addresses only the question of whether and when it is lawful for the US government
to target US citizens abroad. We do not know what legal standards the Administration believes
apply to the targeting of non-citizens. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the standards
applicable to non-citizens are less exacting than those the Administration views as applicable to
citizens.
Defenders of administration targeted killing policy acknowledge that the criteria for
determining how to answer these many questions have not been made public, but insist that this
should not be cause for concern. The Administration has reportedly developed a detailed
“playbook” outlining the targeting criteria and procedures,40, and insiders insist that executive
branch officials go through an elaborate process in which they carefully consider every possible
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issue before determining that a drone strike is lawful.41
No doubt they do, but this is somewhat cold comfort. Formal processes tend to further
normalize once-exceptional activities -- and "trust us" is a rather shaky foundation for the rule of
law. Indeed, the whole point of the rule of law is that individual lives and freedom should not
depend solely on the good faith and benevolence of government officials.
As with law of war arguments, stating that US targeted killings are clearly legal under
traditional self-defense principles requires some significant cognitive dissonance. Law exists to
restrain untrammeled power. It is no doubt possible to make a plausible legal argument justifying
each and every U.S. drone strike -- but this merely suggests that we are working with a legal
framework that has begun to outlive its usefulness.
The real question isn't whether U.S. drone strikes are "legal." The real question is this: Do
we really want to live in a world in which the U.S. government's justification for killing is so
malleable?

5. Setting Troubling International Precedents
Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on drone strikes: Other
states will follow America's example, and the results are not likely to be pretty. Consider once
again the Letelier murder, which was an international scandal in 1976: If the Letelier
assassination took place today, the Chilean authorities would presumably insist on their national
right to engage in “targeted killings” of individuals deemed to pose imminent threats to Chilean
national security -- and they would justify such killings using precisely the same legal theories
the US currently uses to justify targeted killings in Yemen or Somalia. We should assume that
governments around the world—including those with less than stellar human rights records, such
as Russia and China—are taking notice.
Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to
armed drones, but that will not last long. We should use this window to advance a robust legal
and normative framework that will help protect against abuses by those states whose leaders can
rarely be trusted. Unfortunately, we are doing the exact opposite: Instead of articulating norms
about transparency and accountability, the United States is effectively handing China, Russia,
and every other repressive state a playbook for how to foment instability and –literally -- get
away with murder.
Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the
Westphalian international legal order.42 In the international arena, all sovereign states are
formally considered equal and possessed of the right to control their own internal affairs free of
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interference from other states. That's what we call the principle of non-intervention -- and it
means, among other things, that it is generally prohibited for one state to use force inside the
borders of another sovereign state. There are some well-established exceptions, but they are few
in number. A state can lawfully use force inside another sovereign state with that state's
invitation or consent, or when force is authorized by the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to the
U.N. Charter,43 or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack."
The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the
United States don't violate another state's sovereignty as long as that state either consents or is
"unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted." That sounds
superficially plausible, but since the United States views itself as the sole arbiter of whether a
state is "unwilling or unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular.
It goes like this: The United States -- using its own malleable definition of "imminent" -decides that Person X, residing in sovereign State Y, poses a threat to the United States and
requires killing. Once the United States decides that Person X can be targeted, the principle of
sovereignty presents no barriers, because either 1) State Y will consent to the U.S. use of force
inside its borders, in which case the use of force presents no sovereignty problems or 2) State Y
will not consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case, by definition, the
United States will deem State Y to be "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat" posed by
Person X and the use of force again presents no problem.
This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, and
has the potential to significantly destabilize the already shaky collective security regime created
by the U.N. Charter.44 If the US is the sole arbiter of whether and when it can use force inside the
borders of another state, any other state strong enough to get away with it is likely to claim
similar prerogatives. And, of course, if the US executive branch is the sole arbiter of what
constitutes an imminent threat and who constitutes a targetable enemy combatant in an illdefined war, why shouldn’t other states make identical arguments—and use them to justify the
killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?

6. Towards solutions: ensuring that US targeted killing policy does not undermine the rule of
law.
I have suggested in this testimony that while the law of war and the international law of
self-defense may provide justification for US targeted killing policy, it is, in practice, difficult to
say for sure. This is because decisions about who is a combatant, what threats are imminent and
so on are inherently fact specific. Since US targeted killings take place under a cloak of secrecy,
it is impossible for outsiders to evaluate the facts or apply the law to specific facts.
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I have also suggested that we face a problem that is deeper still: we are attempting to
apply old law to novel situations. As I noted earlier, the law of war evolved in response to
traditional armed conflicts, and cannot be easily applied to relations between states and
geographically diffuse non-state terrorist organizations. When we try to apply the law of war to
modern terrorist threats, we encounter numerous translation problems. Most disturbingly, it
becomes nearly impossible to make a principled decision about when the law of war is
applicable in the first place, and when it is not.
As I noted earlier, law is almost always out of date: legal rules are made based on the
conditions and technologies existing at the time, and as societies and technologies change, law
increasingly becomes an exercise in jamming square pegs into round holes. Up to a point, this
works, but eventually, that process begins to do damage to existing law: it gets stretched out of
shape, or broken. At that point, we need to update our laws and practices before too much
damage is done.
This is a daunting project, and I do not have any simple solutions to offer. In a sense, the
struggle to adapt old legal frameworks and institutions to radically new situations will be the
work of generations. But the complexity of the problem should not be an excuse for ignoring it.
In that spirit, I will suggest several potential means to improve on the existing state of affairs and
enhance oversight, transparency and accountability. Congress can implement some of these
recommendations, while others would require Administration acquiescence. Fully evaluating the
pros and cons of potential reforms is beyond the scope of this testimony, but I hope that this will
be the subject of future hearings.
1. Congress should encourage Administration transparency and public debate by continuing
to hold hearings on targeted killing policy, its relationship to (and impact on) broader US
counterterrorism, national security and foreign policy goals, and appropriate mechanisms
for improving oversight, accountability and conformity to US rule of law values.
Congress should also consider hearings on the longer-term challenge of adapting the law
of war and law of self-defense to 21st century threats.
2. Congress should also encourage Administration transparency through the imposition of
reporting requirements. Congress could require that the executive branch provide
thorough reports on any uses of force not expressly authorized by Congress and/or
outside specified regions, and require that such reports contain both classified sections
and unclassified sections in which the Administration provides a legal and policy analysis
of any use of force in self-defense or other uses of force outside traditional battlefields.
3. Congress should consider repealing the 2001 AUMF. The Obama administration’s
domestic legal justification for most drone strikes relies on the AUMF, which it interprets
to authorize the use of force not only against those individuals and organizations with
some real connection to the 9/11 attacks, but also against all “associates” of al Qaeda.
This flexible interpretation of the AUMF creates few constraints, and has lowered the
threshold for using force. Repealing the AUMF would not deprive the President of the
ability to use force if necessary to prevent or respond to a serious armed attack: the
president would retain his existing discretionary power, as chief executive and




commander in chief, to protect the nation in emergencies. Repealing the 2001 AUMF
would, however, likely reduce the frequency with which the president resorts to targeted
killings.
4. The Constitution gives Congress the power to “define and punish offenses against the law
of nations.” Without tying the president’s hands, Congress can pass a resolution
clarifying that the international law of self-defense requires a rigorous imminence,
necessity and proportionality analysis, and that the use of cross-border military force
should be reserved for situations in which there is concrete evidence of grave threats to
the United States or our allies that cannot be addressed through other means.
5. Congress and/or the Executive branch should create a non-partisan blue ribbon
commission made up of senior experts on international law, national security, human
rights, foreign policy and counterterrorism. Commission members should have or receive
the necessary clearances to review intelligence reports and conduct a thorough policy
review of past and current targeted killing policy, evaluating the risk of setting
international precedents, the impact of US targeted killing policy on allies, and the impact
on broader US counterterrorism goals.
In the absence of a judicial review mechanism, such a commission might also be tasked
with reviewing particular strikes to determine whether any errors or abuses have taken
place. The commission should release a public, unclassified report as well as a classified
report made available to executive branch and congressional officials, and the report
should continue detailed recommendations, including, if applicable, recommendations for
changes in law and policy and recommendations for further action of any sort, including,
potentially, compensation for civilians harmed by US drone strikes. The unclassified
report should contain as few redactions as possible.
6. Congress should urge the President to publicly acknowledge all targeted killings outside
traditional battlefield within a reasonable time period, identifying those who were
targeted, laying out (with the minimal number of appropriate redactions) the legal and
factual basis for the decision to target, and identifying, to the best of available
knowledge, death, property damage and injury resulting from the strike(s).
7. Congress should urge the President to release unclassified versions of all legal
memoranda relating to targeted killing policy. In particular, US citizens have a right to
understand the government’s views on the legality of targeting US citizens; there is no
conceivable justification for failing to make this information public.
8. Congress should urge the president to also provide the public with information about the
process through which targeting decisions outside traditional battlefields are made, the
chain of command for such decisions, and internal procedures designed to prevent
civilian casualties. Most military operational and legal manuals are publicly available,
and this issue should be no different. If reports of a targeted killing “playbook” are
accurate, an unclassified version should be released to the public.





9. Congress should urge the administration should convene, through appropriate diplomatic
and track II channels, an international dialogue on norms governing the use of drone
technologies and targeted killings. The goal should be to develop consensus and a code
of conduct on the legal principles applicable to targeted killing outside a state’s territory,
including those relating to sovereignty, proportionality and distinction, and on
appropriate procedural safeguards to prevent and redress error and abuse.
10. Congress should consider creating a judicial mechanism, perhaps similar to the existing
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to authorize and review the legality of targeted
killings outside of traditional battlefields. While the Administration may argue that such
targeting decisions present non-justiciable political questions because of the President’s
commander-in-chief authority, the use of military force outside of traditional battlefields
and against geographically dispersed non-state actors straddles the lines between war and
law enforcement. While the President must clearly be granted substantial discretion in the
context of armed conflicts, the applicability of the law of armed conflict to a particular
situation requires that the law be interpreted and applied to a particular factual situation,
and this is squarely the type of inquiry the judiciary is bested suited to making.
It is also worth noting that the practical concerns militating against justiciability in the
context of traditional wartime situations do not exist to the same degree here. On
traditional battlefields, imposing due process or judicial review requirements on targeting
decisions would be unduly burdensome, as many targeting decisions must be made in
situations of extreme urgency. In the context of targeted killings outside traditional
battlefields, this is rarely the case. While the window of opportunity in which to strike a
given target may be brief and urgent, decisions about whether an individual may lawfully
be targeted are generally made well in advance.
A judicial mechanism designed to ensure that US targeted killing policy complies with
US law and the law of armed conflict might take any of several forms. Most
controversially, a court might be tasked with the ex ante determination of whether a
particular individual could lawfully be targeted.
This approach is likely to be strenuously resisted by the Administration on separation of
powers grounds, and it also raises potential issues about whether the Constitution’s case
and controversy requirement could be satisfied, insofar as proceedings before such a
judicial body would, of necessity, be in camera and ex parte.45 This is also true for the
existing FISA court, however, and its procedures have generally been upheld on Fourth
Amendment grounds. It would seem odd to permit ex parte proceedings in an effort to
ensure judicial approval for surveillance, but reject such proceedings as insufficiently
protective of individual rights when an individual has been selected for lethal targeting
rather than mere search and seizure.
I believe it would be possible to design an ex ante judicial mechanism that would pass
constitutional and practical muster. It would be complex and controversial, however, and
there is an alternative approach that might offer many of the same benefits with far fewer
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of the difficulties. This alternative approach would be to develop a judicial mechanism
that conducts a post hoc review of targeted killings, perhaps through a statute creating a
cause of action for damages for those claiming wrongful injury or death as a result of
unlawful targeted killing operations. This would add additional incentives for executive
branch officials to abide by the law, without placing the judiciary in the troubling role of
authorizing or rejecting the use of military force in advance. While proceedings might
need to be conducted at least partially in camera, judicial decisions in these cases could
be released in redacted form.
It is not possible for this testimony to fully address the many permutations of potential
judicial review mechanisms for targeted killing, but I hope this is an issue that will
generate further discussion and inquiry in this sub-committee. To that end, it is worth
noting that the notion of judicial review of targeted killing is one that has been validated
by the courts of one of our closest allies, Israel.
The Israeli Supreme Court addressed the issue of targeted killing in a 2006 decision, and
roundly rejected the view that targeted killing presents a non-justiciable issue.46 The court
insisted that the legality of each targeted killing decision must be individually considered
in light of domestic and international legal requirements. It determined that while the
conflict between Israel and Palestinian terrorist organizations was an international armed
conflict, individual terrorist suspects were civilians who become targetable by virtue (and
only by virtue) of their direct participation in hostilities, a concept the court analyzed in
detail. The court also noted that international law requires independent investigations
when civilians are targeted because of their suspected participation in hostilities. While
specific judicial review mechanisms in the US might reasonably be expected to vary from
those in place in Israel, the Israeli experience strongly suggests that there is no inherent
reason judicial review of targeted killings could not occur.

Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cruz and members and staff of the subcommittee, wee need to
start talking honestly about drones, the activities they enable and the strategic and legal
frameworks in which these activities take place. Drone critics need to end their irrational
insistence on viewing drones as somehow inherently “immoral.” But drone strike boosters also
need to engage in a more honest conversation, and grapple with the argument that although drone
strikes appear to offer cheap and low-risk “quick fix” approach to counterterrorism, they may
well be doing the US as much harm as good.
In particular, we need to address the rule of law implications of US targeted killing
policy. Every individual detained, targeted, and killed by the U.S. government may well deserve
his fate. But when a government claims for itself the unreviewable power to kill anyone,
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anywhere on earth, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret information discussed in a
secret process by largely unnamed individuals, it undermines the rule of law.
One can argue, as the Obama Administration does, that current US drone policy is
entirely lawful, and perhaps this is so, if we’re willing to take virtually everything about the
strikes on faith, and don’t mind jamming square pegs into round holes. But "legality" is not the
same as morality or common sense. Current US drone policy offers no safeguards against abuse
or error, and sets a dangerous precedent that other states are sure to exploit.
Thank you once again for affording me this opportunity to testify. There is nothing
preordained about how we use new technologies, but by lowering the perceived costs of using
lethal force, drone technologies enable a particularly invidious sort of mission creep. When
covert killings are the rare exception, they do not pose a fundamental challenge to the legal,
moral, and political framework in which we live. But when covert killings become a routine and
ubiquitous tool of U.S. foreign policy, we cannot afford to let them remain in the legal and moral
shadows.
We need an honest conversation about how to bring targeted killings under a rule of law
umbrella, by creating more transparent rules and more robust checks and balances. I am grateful
to all of you for helping to foster such an honest conversation.





